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POOR LAW: THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT'S
CITIZENSHIP DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENT FOR
MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY
Jacob Pres;
On February 8, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (the "DRA").' Included in the DRA is a new
requirement that federal Medicaid funding must be denied to indi-
viduals who claim U.S. citizenship but are unable to produce accept-
able documentation. Entitled "Improved Enforcement of Documen-
tation Requirements," the provision appears in Section 6036 of the
DRA,2 amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b.
J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2006; A.B., Harvard University, 1991. 1 am
grateful to Professor Kermit Roosevelt III, Maura McKenna, Jeremy Spiegel, and all the mem-
bers of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their criticism, encourage-
ment, and assistance. All errors are my own.
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6036, 120 Stat. 4, 171 (2006). Due
to a clerical error, the two houses of Congress passed versions of the DRA that contain substan-
tively different provisions regulating Medicare payments for durable medical equipment. Rep.
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, nonetheless certified the more restrictive Senate version,
which was signed by President Bush. As of this writing, the constitutionality of this procedure-
a question outside the scope of this comment-has been challenged in two suits arguing that
House and Senate language was not identical at passage. No decisions have yet been rendered.
SeeJonathan Weisman, Spending Measure Not a Law, Suit Says, Senate, House Versions Are Different,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 22, 2006, at A4; Press Release, Public Citizen, Deficit Reduction Act
Challenged By Second Lawsuit (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.prvebdirect.com/
releases/2006/3/prweb365911.php; see also Letter from U.S. Representative Henry A. Waxman
to U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi (Feb. 14, 2006), http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/
Documents/20060214170704-70767.pdf (summarizing arguments as to the unconstitutionality
of the certification procedure).
2 Section 6036 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provides the following:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 1903 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396b) is amended-
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(x) (1) For purposes of subsection (i) (23), the requirement of this subsection is, with
respect to an individual declaring to be a citizen or national of the United States, that,
subject to paragraph (2), there is presented satisfactory documentary evidence of citizen-
ship or nationality (as defined in paragraph (3)) of the individual.
"(2) The requirement of paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien who is eligible for
medical assistance under this title-
"(A) and is entitled to or enrolled for benefits under any part of title XVIII;
"(B) on the basis of receiving supplemental security income benefits tinder title
XVI; or
"(C) on such other basis as the Secretary may specify under which satisfactory
documentary evidence of citizenship or nationality had been previously presented.
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This comment argues that the citizenship documentation re-
quirement of Section 6036 is incompatible with constitutionally-
mandated norms of justice and equality; that the Supreme Court has
sound doctrinal footing for a decision to enforce these norms by
voiding Section 6036 under a heightened rational basis standard of
review; and that, as a matter of judicial policy, such review is appro-
priate.
1. THE NEW SECTION 6036 REQUIREMENT
"Medicaid" is a creature of 42 USC § 19, which authorizes the fed-
eral government to appropriate funds:
"(3) (A) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'satisfactory documentary evidence
of citizenship or nationality' means-
"(i) any document described in subparagraph (B); or
"(ii) a document described in subparagraph (C) and a document described in
subparagraph (D).
"(B) The following are documents described in this subparagraph:
"(i) A United States passport.
"(ii) Form N-550 or N-570 (Certificate of Naturalization).
"(iii) Form N-560 or N-561 (Certificate of United States Citizenship).
"(iv) A valid State-issued driver's license or other identity document described in
section 274A(b) (1) (D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but only if the State is-
suing the license or such document requires proof of United States citizenship before
issuance of such license or document or obtains a social security number from the ap-
plicant and verifies before certification that such number is valid and assigned to the
applicant who is a citizen.
"(v) Such other document as the Secretary may specify, by regulation, that pro-
vides proof of United States citizenship or nationality and that provides a reliable
means of documentation of personal identity.
"(C) The following are documents described in this subparagraph:
"(i) A certificate of birth in the United States.
"(ii) Form FS-545 or Form DS-1350 (Certification of Birth Abroad).
"(iii) Form 1-97 (United States Citizen Identification Card).
"(iv) Form FS-240 (Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States).
"(v) Such other document (not described in subparagraph (B)(iv)) as the Secre-
tary may specify that provides proof of United States citizenship or nationality.
"(D) The following are documents described in this subparagraph:
"(i) Any identity document described in section 274A(b) (1) (D) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.
"(ii) Any other documentation of personal identity of such other type as the Sec-
retary finds, by regulation, provides a reliable means of identification.
"(E) A reference in this paragraph to a form includes a reference to any successor
form.'
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply to deter-
minations of initial eligibility for medical assistance made on or afterJuly 1, 2006, and to
redeterminations of eligibility made on or after such date in the case of individuals for
whom the requirement of section 1903(z) of the Social Security Act, as added by such
amendments, was not previously met.
(c) IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENT.-As soon as practicable after the date of enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Se-vices shall establish an outreach
program that is designed to educate individuals who are likely to be affected by the re-
quirements of subsections (i) (23) and (x) of section 1903 of the Social Security Act (as
added by subsection (a)) about such requirements and how they may be satisfied.
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[f]or the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled indi-
viduals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to
help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for inde-
pendence or self-care ....
If a state creates a Medicaid program, it must "provide-for making
medical assistance available.., to... all individuals" who are mem-
bers of certain mandatory groups.4 These groups include: children
under age six living in a family with an income below 133% of the
federal poverty line ("FPL"); children under age nineteen living in a
family with an income at or below the FPL; parents with an income
that would have qualified them for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC"-previously "welfare") as ofJuly 1996 (nationwide,
this is a median income of 42% of the federal poverty line) ;" pregnant
women with an income at or below 133% of the federal poverty line;
certain elderly or disabled individuals who are Medicare beneficiar-
ies; and certain impoverished elderly, blind, and disabled recipients
of Supplemental Security Income (SSI",).6
Today, Medicaid is the largest single source of health care funding
for the poorest Americans. As of June 2004, approximately 41 mil-
3 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) 10-(a) (10) (A) (i) (2000).
5 The federal "poverty line" for the continental United States is an annual income of $9,570
for one person and $16,090 for a family of three. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guide-
lines, 70 Fed. Reg. 8373, 8373-75 (Feb. 18, 2005).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (i) (2000). For mandatory groups, there is a certain level of
mandatory coverage. States may expand this coverage in certain ways if they so choose. See gen-
erally DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CENTER
FOR MEDICAID AND STATE OPERATIONS, MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005: A MEDICAID INFORMATION
SOURCE 3 (2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenlnfo/Downloads/
MedicaidAtAGlance2005.pdf; EARL DIRK HOFFMAN, JR., CLARE M. MCFARLAND & CATHERINE A.
CURTIS, BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID: TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACr 13-17 (2002), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareProgramRatesStats/
downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2002.pdf; ANNA SOMMERS, ARUNABH GHOSH & DAVID
ROUSSEAU, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING BY "MANDATORY" AND "OPTIONAL" ELIGIBILITY
AND BENEFIT CATEGORIES (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Medicaid-Enrollment-
and-Spending-by-Mandatory-and-Optional-Eligibility-and-Benefit-Categories-Report.pdf. Fed-
eral Medicaid policy is implemented by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
("CMS") of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS").
7 See HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 12 ("Medicaid is the largest source of funding for
medical and health-related services for America's poorest people."); see also VERNON K. SMITH,
MAKING MEDICAID BETTER: OPTIONS TO ALLOW STATES TO CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE AND TO
BRING THE PROGRAM UP TO DATE IN TODAY'S HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE 3 (2002),
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/MAKINGMEDICAIDBETTER.pdf ("It is difficult to over-
estimate the importance and impact of Medicaid, because the program is so large, it serves so
many people in so many different population groups and plays a role in helping to finance vir-
tually every state program that relates to health.").
Sept. 20061
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
lion individuals-14% of the U.S. population-received Medicaid
benefits.8 In the 2004 fiscal year, the federal government spent $176
billion on Medicaidg (nearly 8% of total federal spending) 0 and states• • • -- • 12
combined spent $115 billion' (nearly 22% of total state spending).
In 2000 and 2001, Medicaid financed 56.2% of births in Louisiana,
52.6% in Alaska, and 51.7% in New Mexico.'
3
The average annual family income of adults covered by a Medi-
caid program was estimated at $18,614 in 2001.' 4 The vast majority of
beneficiaries cannot afford to pay for medical services out-of-pocket
as needed, do not have access to an employer-provided health insur-
ance plan, and cannot afford to purchase insurance independently. 5
8 See EILEEN R. ELLIS, VERNON K. SMITH & DAVID M. ROUSSEAU, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT IN
50 STATES: JUNE 2004 DATA UPDATE 4 (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7349.pdf
(documenting Medicaid enrollment growth since 2000). The U.S. population in 2004 was
288,280,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION BY SEX, AGE, AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP STATUS 1
(2004), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/foreign/ppl-176/tabOl-I.pdf.
9 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, MONTHLY BUDGET REVIEW: A CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE ANALYSIS 2 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
showdoc.cfm?index=6693&sequence=0 (reporting budgetary information for the fiscal year
2005).
Total federal spending in 2004 was $2.293 trillion. Congressional Budget Office, Historical
Budget Data 2 (2006), http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.pdf.
See Press Release, CMS, Healthcare Spending Growth Rate Continues to Decline in 2004:
Drug Spending Growth One-Half of Rate Five Years Ago (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/ media/press/release.asp?Counter=1750 (estimating total fed-
eral and state Medicaid costs for 2004 at $291 billion).
12 Total state spending in 2004 was $523 billion. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION &
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 18 (2005),
http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/fiscalsurvey/fsfall2005.pdf (reporting FY 2004 state fiscal
data).
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES, MCH UPDATE: STATES
PROTECT HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DURING RECENT FISCAL DOWNTURN 6 (2005),
http://preview.nga.org/Files/pdf/0508MCHUPDATE.PDF (evaluating Medicaid service provi-
sion to women and children).
14 KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A LOWER COST
APPROACH TO SERVING A HIGH COST POPULATION 2 (2004), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getile.cfm&PageID=
33829 (citing Jack Hadley &John Holahan, Is Health Care Spending Higher under Medicaid or Pri-
vate Insurance?, 40 INQUIRY 323 (2003)).
15 See AMY DAVIDOFF, BOWEN GARRETT & ALSHADYE YEMANE, URBAN INSTITUTE, MEDICAID-
ELIGIBLE ADULTS WHO ARE NOT ENROLLED: WHO ARE THEY AND DO THEY GET THE CARE THEY
NEED? 2 (2001), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310378-anf a48.pdf (concluding that
Medicaid-eligible adults who do not enroll and are uninsured face substantial barriers to access
to medical care); KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID
PROGRAM AT A GLANCE 1 (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/The-Medicaid-
Program-at-a-Glance-Fact-Sheet.pdf ("In general, private health insurance is not an option for
the Medicaid population .... In the absence of the Medicaid program, the vast majority of its
beneficiaries would join the ranks of the 45 million uninsured Americans."); SHARON K. LONG &
JOHN A. GRAVES, URBAN INSTITUTE, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN PUBLIC COVERAGE Is NO LONGER AVAILABLE? 6 (2006),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7449.pdf ("Given the lack of affordable alternatives for
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For them, loss of access to Medicaid-funded health care means loss of
access to health care-and to health itself.'6
One of the federal baseline requirements for full Medicaid eligi-
bility is that recipients be U.S. citizens, nationals, or qualified aliens."
The category of "qualified alien" was created in the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
("PRWORA") and includes lawful permanent residents, refugees,
asylees, and certain other narrowly defined groups. To qualify for
public benefits, qualified aliens must present documentation of their
immigration status, which then also must be verified by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service ("INS").18 By contrast, federal law did
not, before the passage of the 2005 DRA, impose similar require-
ments upon Medicaid applicants claiming U.S. citizenship or nation-
ality. Such individuals were required only to submit "a declaration in
writing, under penalty of perjury ... stating whether the individual is
a citizen or national of the United States."' 9 States were free to im-
pose more stringent documentation requirements, but they were dis-
couraged from doing so by the federal agency entrusted with over-
sight of the Medicaid program, the Centers for Medicare and
coverage, it is likely that, in the face of cutbacks in eligibility for public programs, the vast ma-
jority of affected current enrollees will become uninsured...").
16 See COMMISSION ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE
WITHOUT COVERAGE: Too LITTLE, Too LATE 1-2 (2002) (finding that the uninsured receive
less preventive care, less appropriate care for chronic illnesses, and fewer hospital services when
admitted); Janet Currie & Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance Eligibility, Utilization of Medical Care
and Child Health, 111 Q. J. ECON. 431, 454 (1996) (reporting that expansions of Medicaid eligi-
bility for low-income children in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a 5.1 percent reduction in
childhood deaths); Jack Hadley, Sicker and Poorer-The Consequences of Being Uninsured: A Review
of the Research on the Relationship between Health Insurance, Medical Care Use, Health, Work, and In-
come, 60 MED. CARE RES. & REv. 3S, 60S (2003) (surveying the substantial body of research sup-
porting hypotheses that having health insurance improves health); Nicole Lurie et al., Termina-
tion from Medi-Cal Benefits: A Follow-up Study One Year Later, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1266, 1268
(1996) (finding that California's decision to remove medically indigent adults from the state
medical benefits program led to worsened access to care for those individuals).
17 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C).
Congress's power to discriminate in this manner has been clearly established. See Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976) (upholding federal discrimination on the basis of alienage in allo-
cation of Medicaid benefits against an equal protection challenge by applying minimal rational
basis review); Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 583 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); City of Chicago v.
Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 598-99 (7th Cir. 1999) (same, concerning welfare benefits); Rodriguez v.
United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) (same, concerning allocation of SSI and
food stamps). But see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971) (striking down state
discrimination on the basis of alienage in the allocation of welfare benefits as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, applying heightened scrutiny).
is See CMS, Questions and Answers on Verification of Citizenship and Immigration Status,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility/downloads/Verification4.pdf (listing the citizen-
ship verification requirements for Medicaid applicants).
19 42 U.S.C. 1320b-7(d) (1) (A) (2000).
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Medicaid Services ("CMS"). Instead, CMS recommended addressing
fraud through strategies such as verifying the accuracy of citizenship
statements against independent sources and conducting post-
201eligibility reviews.
At the time President Bush signed the DRA, forty-six states and
the District of Columbia followed CMS recommendations and ac-
cepted self-declarations as proof of citizenship for the purpose of de-
termining Medicaid eligibility in at least some circumstances.2 ' Forty-
four of these jurisdictions followed a "prudent person policy," provid-
ing that officials must require documentation from applicants whose
statements are deemed questionable . An additional four states re-
23quired supporting documentary evidence in all cases.
Section 6036 completely revises this system. Under the new law,
states will no longer be free to shape their own policies with respect
to citizenship verification. Instead they will be required by federal
law to withhold federal Medicaid dollars from individuals who apply
as U.S. citizens or nationals but cannot provide "satisfactory docu-
mentary evidence of citizenship.2 4 Section 6036 specifically defines
"satisfactory documentary evidence" as either (1) a passport or other
government-issued certification of citizenship or nationality or (2) a
U.S. birth certificate or equivalent document plus additional proof of
identity.25 The Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized
to designate documents that may substitute for a passport in category
20 See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SELF-
DECLARATION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP FOR MEDICAID 18-19 (2005),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-03-00190.pdf (presenting CMS policy and recommenda-
tions concerning citizenship fraud prevention) [hereinafter HHS SELF-DECLARATION]; CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., CONTINUING THE PROGRESS: ENROLLING AND RETAINING
LOW-INCOME FAMILIES AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE 3 (2001),
http://www.childrenspartnership.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Medcaid and SCHIP&CON
TENTID=6495&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm [hereinafter CMS PROG-RESS] (dis-
couraging requirement of household Social Security information for Medicaid approval).
21 See HHS SELF-DECLARATION, supra note 20, at 9 (surveying methods employed by states to
verify citizenship for Medicaid purposes).
22 Id.
23 Id. Note that these states too may be required to revise their procedures to comply with
Section 6036. For instance, New York requires documentation from all applicants, but in the
absence of "primary documentation" will accept "secondary documentation," including: a letter
indicating that a search for a birth certificate failed to locate one, an early school record, or a
notarized affidavit from a blood relative familiar with circumstances of birth. STATE OF NEW
YORK DEP'T OF HEALTH, CITIZENSHIP AND ALIEN STATUS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MEDICAID
PROGRAM 9-10 (2004), http://www.health.state.ny.us/health care/medicaid/publications/
docs/adm/04adm-7.pdf.
24 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2000), amended by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171,
§ 6036, 120 Stat. 4, 171 (2006).
25 Id. See also LEIGHTON KU & MArT BROADDUS, CENTER FOR BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES
NEW REQUIREMENT FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES OR PASSPORTS COULD THREATEN MEDICAID
COVERAGE FOR VULNERABLE BENEFICIARIES: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2006),
http://www.cbpp.org/ 1-5-06health.pdf (reviewing DRA document requirements).
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1. But in order to enter the pool of documents that are eligible to be
so designated, a document must provide "proof of United States citi-
zenship or nationality"26 and also be "a reliable means of documenta-
tion of personal identity. '27  Similarly, the secretary may designate
documents that may substitute for a birth certificate in category 2, but
only if such documents "provide[] proof of United States citizenship
or nationality. "2  These limiting requirements swallow up the discre-tion that the provisions seem at first glance to allow. 2 9
II. WHAT WILL SECTION 6036 Do?
In its current version, Section 6036 "shall apply to determinations
of initial eligibility for medical assistance made on or after July 1,
2006, and to re-determinations of eligibility made on or after such
date in the case of individuals for whom the requirement.., was not
previously met. ",3 State Medicaid agencies generally must re-
determine the eligibility of the recipient every 12 months. 3 1  Of ap-
proximately 41 million current Medicaid recipients, 92% qualify as•• 32
U.S. citizens. The states thus will be required to make almost 38 mil-
lion citizenship determinations between July 1, 2006 and July 1,
2007. 3  CMS' new "quality control" system, meanwhile, threatens to
impose fiscal penalties upon states that fail to enforce federal re-
34quirements in a timely manner.
There has been no public discussion of the legislative intent of
Section 6036 aside from that provided by U.S. Representative Charlie
26 DRA, § 6036 (a)
27 Id.
28 Id.
John Stone, a spokesman for Rep. Norwood, has claimed that Section 6036 provides "wig-
gle room" so that "the secretary could establish that an elderly person who has received Social
Security benefits for years is obviously a citizen." Eunice Moscoso, Bill Add5 Citizen ID Test for
Medicaid, Cox NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.oxfordpress.com/news/content/
shared/news/nation/stories/2006/01/NATIMMIGO119A5REP.html. This is not the law.
Even assuming that a person were able to produce a "document" proving receipt of Social Secu-
rity benefits over a long period of time, such a document would not provide "proof of United
States citizenship" because non-citizens may receive Social Security benefits. DAWN NUSCHLER
& ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESRCH. SERVS., SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS FOR NONCITIZENS: CURRENT
POLICY AND LEGISLATION 4 (2004) ("To qualify for benefits, workers (whether citizens or non-
citizens) must work in Social Security covered jobs for a specified period of time."). In fact, as
noted infra, a colorable argument can be made that not even birth certificates satisfy the pre-
requisites for designation, because they are not "a reliable means of documentation of personal
identity." See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
30 DRA of 2005, § 6036(b) (a).
31 Periodic Redeterminations of Medicaid Eligibility, 42 C.F.R. § 435.916(a) (2002).
32 See KU & BROADDUS, supra note 24, at 4.
3 Id. Ku and Broaddus estimate that there are approximately 55 million total Medicaid
beneficiaries; this figure is significantly higher than that used by other authorities.
34 Id. at 5.
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Norwood (R-GA), an author of the provision and its co-sponsor in the
S 35
House of Representatives. Norwood's office has issued two press re-
leases touting the provision. According to the first of these docu-
ments, Section 6036 is designed to address "the outright theft of
benefits that is currently underway nationwide by illegal aliens.
3 6
The Congressman is quoted as follows:
[n]obody knows for sure how much of our Medicaid dollars we're cur-
rently losing to illegal aliens, but by even the most conservative estimates,
it has played a big role in causing our own citizens - low-income Ameri-
cans, seniors and children, our most vulnerable health care population
37
- to be kicked out of the system to compensate.
In partial support of this contention, the press release cites research
by the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) indicat-
ing that "healthcare for illegal aliens costs California $1.4 billion an-
nually s3 8 and that other states are making similar outlays.39 "By ex-
trapolation, Georgia Medicaid is likely bilked out of $100-300 million
annually."4 0 Per Norwood, Section 6036 will recover this "$300 mil-
lion in health benefits stolen from low-income Georgians by illegal
aliens."41
This argument is reiterated in a second Norwood press release, is-
sued after Section 6036 passed the House:
Georgia is estimated to lose around $300 million of its $7.6 billion
annual Medicaid funds due to illegal aliens who fraudulently claim U.S.
citizenship to claim Medicaid benefits. Georgia and many other states
are being forced to cut back on health services for low-income legal citi-
zens in order to stem the losses.
"It is absolutely intolerable that we have ... allowed some of the
poorest Georgians to lose access to health care due to fraud by illegal
aliens," Norwood says. "After years of listening to 'advocates' whine
about compassion for those who intentionally break our laws for financial
gain, I'm glad to see us finally showing some compassion for our own
poor and sick who abide by the law."
42
Thus, the only legislative apology for Section 6036 proposes the fol-
lowing: (1) a significant number of ineligible non-citizens are impos-
35 Press Release, Rep. Charlie Norwood, Norwood and Deal Open Fight to Preserve Medi-








42 Press Release, Rep. Charlie Norwood, Medicaid Recipients Must Prove U.S. Citizenship
Before Receiving Benefits (Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/
press/ga09_norwood/ MedicaidIllegalsPasses.html
[Vol. 8:5
POOR LAW. THE DEFICIT REDUCTIONACT
ing significant costs upon the federal government by receiving Medi-
caid benefits through fraudulent claims of U.S. citizenship; (2) Sec-
tion 6036's citizenship documentation requirement will result in net
federal savings by reducing fraud; and (3) these savings will enable
fuller access to health care for those properly eligible. Unfortunately,
none of these propositions survives serious consideration.
First, there is no evidence to support Norwood's assertions regard-
ing the extent and cost of Medicaid citizenship fraud by undocu-
mented immigrants. Eliminating health benefits for undocumented
immigrants would require revising current eligibility requirements
themselves, not merely tinkering with procedures. This is because
indigent non-citizens may qualify under current law for certain basic
medical services. These include: "emergency Medicaid" (provided
that, but for their citizenship status, they would be eligible for their
state's Medicaid program) ;43 prenatal care under SCHIP (State Chil-
dren's Health Insurance Program); WIC (the Special Supplemental
Program for Women, Infants and Children); and services for the pre-
vention and treatment of communicable diseases.44 In addition, fed-
eral law requires that hospitals with emergency rooms must screen
and stabilize all individuals who present themselves, though there is
no federal commitment to cover the costs of these services for those
who are uninsured and unable to pay. 5  Section 6036, of course,
leaves these gestures toward an American safety net untouched. Yet
when Norwood cites FAIR's research on the cost of immigrant
43 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (b)(1)(A) (2000). The term "emergency medical condition" is defined to
mean treatment for "labor and delivery" or a "medical condition . .. [with] acute symptoms"
that could "plac[e] the patient's health in serious jeopardy," result in "serious impairment to
bodily functions," or cause "serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396b(v) (3) (2000).
44 See SHAWN FREMSTAD & LAURA COX, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
COVERING NEW AMERICANS: A REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES RELATED TO
IMMIGRANTS' ELIGIBILITY AND ACCESS TO PUBLICLY FUNDED HEALTH INSURANCE 11, 23 (2004),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Covering-New-Americans-A-Review-of-Federa-and-State-
Policies-Related-to-Immigrants-Eligibility-and-Access-to-Publicly-Funded-Health-Insurance-
Report.pdf (discussing medical benefits available to immigrants).
45 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (requiring that the emergency department of a hospital
serve individuals needing medical treatment whether they have medical benefits or not); 42
C.F.R. § 489.24(a) (2005) (mandating that hospitals with emergency rooms serve all individuals
seeking medical treatment regardless of ability to pay). In 2003, Congress appropriated $1 bil-
lion through 2008 to reimburse hospitals for the cost of EMTALA care for indigent undocu-
mented immigrants. Fact Sheet, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., United States Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Emergency Health Services For Undocumented Aliens: Section 1011
Of The Medicare Modernization Act (May 9, 2005), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1452.
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healthcare "theft," he is citing estimates of the cost of emergency care
for the indigent that is provided pursuant to law.
46
But what of ineligible non-citizens who have misrepresented their
citizenship status in order to obtain full Medicaid coverage? Cer-
tainly, current self-declaration procedures raise the specter of abuse.47
Yet, in seeking evidence regarding actual abuse, the Office of the In-
spector General of the Department of Health and Human Services
(OIG) came up empty, identifying only a single 2002 audit report
from Oregon. According to the OIG's account, Oregon "found that
the State provided full Medicaid benefits to 25 beneficiaries (of the
sample of 812) who were noneligible noncitizens" and that citizen-
ship fraud "could result in an annual cost of about $2 million, based
on a 1 percent estimate of noneligible noncitizens receiving Medicaid
benefits. ,4 9 The OIG, however, has misread its source. The Oregon
auditors actually examined only 25 cases, a random subset out of a set
of 812 cases that were chosen specifically because they seemed likely to be cases
of ftaud.0 The Oregon auditors explained: "it was determined that
two of the [25] cases lacked adequate documentation to support
granting full coverage to at least one of the recipients on each case.'
Thus, the OIG's only fraud data suggests, on the basis of an examina-
tion of 25 unrepresentative cases in a system with some 41 million
beneficiaries, that the incidence of fraud (in a state that accepts self-
certification of citizenship by mail with no further verification proce-
dures) will be 8% of those cases deemed likely to be fraudulent. The
Oregon report does note that "if 1 percent of adults receiving full
OHP coverage are ineligible noncitizens, the annual cost is $1.7 mil-
For instance, Norwood cites FAIR for the proposition that "healthcare for illegal aliens
cost California $1.4 billion annually." Press Release, Rep. Charlie Norwood, supra note 35. This
figure has its source in a FAIR report that puts the 2004 cost of unreimbursed emergency medi-
cal care for undocumented immigrants in California at between $378 million and $1.48 billion.
JACK MARTIN & IRA MEHLMAN, FED'N FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE COSTS OF
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO CALIFORNIANS 11 (2004), http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/
ca_costs.pdPdoclD=141. This sum is ultimately rounded out to $1.4 billion, apparently because
the lower sum "does not take into account the expenditures on the children of illegal aliens
who were born in this country." Id. at 10. These children are, of course, U.S. citizens, but the
cost of their care, too, finds its way into Norwood's accounting of total immigrant "theft."
47 See HHS SELF-DECLARATION, supra note 20, at 18 (documenting the potential for fraud
inherent in the current state procedures for establishing the citizenship of Medicaid appli-
cants).
48 See id. at 13-14.
49 Id.
50 See OREGON SEC'Y OF STATE, AUDIT REPORT No. 2002-03, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES: OREGON HEALTH PLAN ELIGIBILITY REVIEW 6 (2002),
http://www.sos.state.or.us/audits/reports/full/2002/2002-03.pdf (noting that the auditors se-
lected "a small population of 812 cases in the department's system that had a status change
from ineligible alien to full coverage" but only "reviewed the documentation ... for... [a]
random sample of 25 cases").
51 _
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lion. 5 2 However, it also notes that there is no reason to believe that
the 1% figure reflects actual fraud levels: "We ... are ... unable to
estimate the cost to the department of granting full OHP coverage to
ineligible non-citizens claiming to be United States citizens. 5 3 Inter-
estingly, the audit does cite the definitive conclusion of Oregon's De-
partment of Human Services that "citizenship has not been identified
as an eligibility issue in the [internal] OHP quality control reviews.
'54
Indeed, according to the report itself, the position of the Oregon
DHS is that it "does not believe that ineligible non-citizens claiming
to be United States citizens and receiving full OHP coverage is a sig-
nificant problem. 55
One may properly infer that other states share Oregon's view that
citizenship fraud is a non-phenomenon: they share the burden of
Medicaid costs with the federal government, and they are free to im-
pose more burdensome documentation requirements than the fed-
erally mandated minimum, but only four have chosen to do so.5  As
an Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services spokesper-
son said recently, "I don't see [citizenship fraud] as much of an is-
sue."57 A CMS study echoes this conclusion: "States have found that
they can effectively preserve program integrity without requiring ad-
ditional documentation from families."' 8
The conclusion that there is a negligible level of citizenship fraud
by undocumented immigrants seeking full Medicaid coverage is con-
sistent with what we know about the strained relationship between
immigrants and the U.S. health care system. Immigrants who are
properly eligible for Medicaid apply for coverage in relatively low
numbers in part because of concerns about disclosing family mem-
bers' immigration status;5 even immigrants who are insured receive
52 Id. at 7.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 6.
55 Id. Aliens fraudulently acting as citizens also are absent from the recent report of the
Medicaid Advisory Commission, appointed by Michael Leavitt, Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services. The Commission formulated a menu of policy changes designed
to save $11 billion over five years but nowhere addresses the phenomenon of citizenship fraud.
See generally MEDICAID COMM'N, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE SECRETARY MICHAEL 0. LEAVrrI',
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (2005),
http://www.healthlaw.org/library.cfm?fa=download&resourcelD=71353&appView
=folder&folderID=76608&print (outlining proposals to cut Medicaid costs).
56 See supra note 23.
57 Julie Munsell, Alien-Identity Flaw Seen in Medicaid, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 4,
2005, at 1.
58 CMS PROGRESS, supra note 20, at 3.
59 See id. ("Concerns about disclosing family members' Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and
citizenship or immigration status can deter eligible individuals from applying for Medicaid.
These concerns appear to stem from uncertainty among immigrant families and others regard-
ing the confidentiality of information they provide to States.").
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about half the medical services provided to native-born Americans
who are comparably situated. 6 Furthermore, all Medicaid applicants
are required to provide a Social Security number which states then
are required to verify;61 undocumented immigrants are likely to be
further deterred by this prospect.
Even if we were to assume that Medicaid citizenship fraud is an
urgent concern, this concern would not be assuaged by Section 6036.
The drafters of this provision display remarkable faith in the birth
certificate as a gold standard for proof of citizenship. Yet a 2000 re-
port by the OIG notes that counterfeit documents are almost certain
to escape detection: there are 6,422 different U.S. entities authorized
to issue birth certificates and an estimated 14,000 different valid
document formats currently in circulation.62 Furthermore, there is
every reason to believe that genuine documents based upon fraudu-
lent information are regularly issued: while other arms of the gov-
ernment may have a "need or requirement for establishing identity,
the issuing entity [for birth certificates] most likely does not., 63 The
OIG's report concludes with a recommendation under the heading
"Birth Certificates Alone do not Provide Conclusive or Reliable Proof
of Identity": "[benefits] program administrators may not want to use
birth certificates [for identity verification] at all.,
64
In light of the above, it may be surprising that there is any evi-
dence to support the view that Section 6036 would go some way to-
ward reducing federal expenditures. However, the non-partisan
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the provision
would result in a savings of $220 million in Medicaid costs over five
years and $735 million over ten years.65 The CBO has provided no
commentary on this estimate, but analysts have concluded that these
estimated savings "would not come from preventing ineligible immi-
60 See generally Sarita A. Mohanty et al., Health Care Expenditures of Immigrants in the United
States: A Nationally Representative Analysis, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1431 (2005) (concluding that,
regardless of age, legal status or insurance coverage, immigrants, on average, receive about half
of the health care services provided to native-born Americans).
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(a) (2000) (obligating states to verify Medicaid applicants' Social
Security numbers); 42 C.F.R. § 435.910 (2005) (requiring that states request Social Security
numbers for each Medicaid applicant); CMS PROGRESS, supra note 20, at 3 ("Under Federal
rules, applicants for Medicaid ... must disclose their SSNs .... The State is required to verify the
SSN with the Social Security Administration.").
62 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., BIRTH CERTIFICATE
FRAUD, at ii (2000), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-07-99-00570.pdf (documenting diffi-
culties in birth certificate fraud detection).
63 Id. at 20.
64 Id. at 22.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RECONCILIATION RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 4 (2005),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/68xx/doc6829/ECrecon.pdf. The distance between this estimate
and Rep. Norwood's touted $300 million in annual savings for Georgia alone bears noting.
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grants from wrongly obtaining Medicaid coverage, but from reducing
or delaying Medicaid enrollment for individuals who are U.S. citi-
,,66
zens.
In any event, the CBO estimate likely fills in only part of the larger
fiscal picture. For instance, there is no indication that it accounts for
the administrative costs that would be incurred in the process of ac-
cruing these Section 6036 "savings."'6 In addition, there are costs re-
sulting from increased delays in eligibility determinations, 6 which
would be felt directly by the Medicaid program, as well as the indirect
costs generated by an increase in the number of those persons who
would forego insurance entirely.9 Taking these variables into ac-
count, Section 6036's meager savings melt away.
Rep. Norwood also claims that Section 6036 will preserve Medi-
caid for properly eligible citizens. There is no reason to believe this
will be so. In part, this is because it requires us to assume as a given
that Section 6036 would result in net savings, that federal and state
policyrnakers would be providing higher levels of benefits if they were
able to fund them, and that the savings achieved through reduction
in fraud would necessarily be reinvested in the Medicaid program.
Meredith L. King, Unnecessary Documentation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Dec. 21, 2005,
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biRJ8OVF&b=1312693; cf Victoria Wachino
et al., Medicaid Provisions of House Reconciliation Bill Both Harmful and Unnecessary: Senate Bill
Achieves Larger Savings Without Reducing Access to Care, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES,
Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.cbpp.org/12-9-05health.pdf (finding that the Senate's budget recon-
ciliation bill achieves larger net savings in health care expenditures than the House bill does,
but avoids policies that harm low-income beneficiaries).
67 Twenty-five state Medicaid directors already have indicated that a citizenship documenta-
tion requirement would require them to hire additional staff to perform eligibility reviews. See
HHS SELF-DECLARATION, supra note 20, at 11 (2005).
Twenty-seven state medical directors have indicated that the requirement would delay
eligibility determinations. Id. This delay would translate into an increase in medical costs for
those persons who ultimately were approved, due to the loss of marginal benefit from low-cost
preventative care or early intervention in progressive ailments. See generally AM. COLL. OF
PHYSICIANS, INTERNAL MED., No HEALTH INSURANCE? IT'S ENOUGH TO MAKE YOU SICK (2000),
http://www.acponline.org/uninsured/lack-paper.pdf (noting that early detection and treat-
ment can prevent 90% of blindness due to diabetic eye disease, and that more than 50% of dia-
betes-related lower extremity amputations and related surgery costs could be avoided through
preventive care); Michael C. Lu et al., Elimination of Public Funding of Prenatal Care for Undocu-
mented Immigrants in California: A Cost/Benefit Analysis, 182 Am. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 233
(2000) (finding that every dollar spent on prenatal care saved $3 in care soon after birth and $4
in longer-term medical costs).
For a discussion of the likely impact of Section 6036 on the total number of uninsured,
see infra note 93 and accompanying text. Regarding the cost to the federal government of an
increase in the number of uninsured, see, for example, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, THE COST OF CARE FOR THE UNINSURED: WHAT DO WE SPEND, WHO PAYS, AND
WHAT WOULD FULL COVERAGE ADD TO MEDICAL SPENDING? 3 (2004),
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/7084.cfm (estimating that the total federal, state, and local
spending to pay for the care of the uninsured in 2004 was $34.6 billion, with over two-thirds of
the money coming from the federal government in the form of disproportionate share hospital
(DSH) payments).
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But even if we were to grant all of the above, Norwood's framing of
Section 6036 would remain incredible because all available data sup-
port the conclusion that, far from ensuring that Medicaid will be
available for the poorest citizen beneficiaries, Section 6036's actual
effect will be to prevent many of the neediest from gaining access to
care.
There is unambiguous evidence regarding the relationship be-
tween application procedures and total Medicaid enrollment."' As of
2002, approximately 5.3 million adults were eligible for Medicaid but
were uninsured; three-quarters of them had incomes below the pov-
erty line, and half had incomes below 50% of the poverty line.7 1 As of
1995, approximately 17% of the children who were eligible for Medi-
caid were uninsured. 2 Why? CMS has concluded that "a leading rea-
son why eligible families fail to successfully enroll in Medicaid is that
the families do not supply state-required documentation., 73 In a 1999
survey of low-income parents whose children were uninsured, 9%
cited "administrative hassles" as the "main reason. 74 Comparable re-
sults were obtained in a 2000 survey of parents with eligible children
who were not enrolled in Medicaid: 72% of respondents explained
that they had not enrolled because of "the difficulty in getting all re-
quired documentation," 66% cited the "overall hassle of the enroll-
ment process," and 62% exressed concerns that "the process was
complicated and confusing."
70 See CMS PROGRESS, supra note 20, at 1 ("If the [Medicaid] application process is simple
and easy to complete, a family is more likely to complete it. By the same token, if the process is
complicated, because other programs are involved, a family may be deterred and not complete
the process."); KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED:
STATE CHOICES INFLUENCE HEALTH COVERAGE ACCESS FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 3 (2005),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7393.cfm (describing the expansion of Medicaid rolls through
late 1990s "streamlined enrollment systems"); Karl Kronebusch & Brian Elbel, Enrolling Children
in Public Insurance: SCHIP, Medicaid, and State Implementation, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 451
(2004) (concluding that states that remove asset tests and implement presumptive eligibility
and self-declaration of income have higher SCHIP enrollment levels, while waiting periods and
premiums reduce enrollment).
71 See AMY DAVIDOFF ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HEALTH
COVERAGE FOR LOW-INCOME ADULTS: ELIGIBILITY AND ENROLLMENT IN MEDICAID AND STATE
PROGRAMS, 2002, at 2 (2005), http://www.kff.org/nninsured/upload/Health-Coverage-for-Low-
Income-Adults-Eligibility-and-Enrollment-in-Medicaid-and-State-Programs-2002-Policy-Brief.pdf
(surveying the non-elderly Medicaid-eligible population).
72 See Amy Davidoff et al., Medicaid-Eligible Children Who Don't Enroll: Health Status, Access to
Care, and Implications for Medicaid Enrollment, 37 INQUIRY 203, 203, 210 (2000) (assessing the
number of uninsured children to establish the effectiveness of state programming).
73 CMS PROGRESS, supra note 20, at 2.
74 GENEVIEVE KENNEY & JENNIFER HALEY, URBAN INSTITUTE, WHY AREN'T MORE UNINSURED
CHILDREN ENROLLED IN MEDICAID OR SCHIP? 4 (2001), http://www.urban.org/Upload-
edPDF/310217_ANF_B35.pdf.
75 MICHAEL PERRY ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID
AND CHILDREN OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ENROLLMENT FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 9
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To address these concerns, many have recommended that appli-
cation procedures be streamlined, "simplifying forms and documen-
tation requirements, substituting mail-in and telephone applications
for face-to-face interviews, reducing or eliminating monthly eligibility
redeterminations, and creating presumptive eligibility procedures
that allow medical providers to conditionally enroll those who appear
to be eligible."7 6 One recent study concludes that even with respect to
determining income eligibility, self-declaration, "with appropriate
safeguards, provides states with the opportunity to simplify enroll-
ment procedures and increase enrollment of eligible individuals
without jeopardizing program integrity."
77
Instead, the trend is in the opposite direction.78 Washington state
is typical. In March 2003, it had a children's Medicaid enrollment of
350,000; in April of that year, it began requiring income eligibility
documentation; in July, it began requiring eligibility determinations
to take place every six months instead of every twelve. By May 2004,
40,000 fewer children were enrolled. 9  While it is conceivable that
11% of the March 2003 child beneficiaries were ineligible due to ex-
cessive income and were properly screened out, at least one study has
concluded that it is more likely that the bulk of this decline is unre-
lated to eligibility. s°
In light of the above, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that
the primary effect of Section 6036's new documentation requirement
(2000), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Medicaid-and-Children-vercomingBarriers-to-
Enroll-ment-Report.pdf.
76 Kronebusch & Elbel, supra note 70, at 453 (describing changes proposed by "advocates
and policy makers"). See also CMS PROGRESS, supra note 20, at ii (outlining state best practices
"to streamline application and eligibility determination processes consistent with the principles
of both simplicity of administration and program integrity" with the goal "to ensure that low-
income families and children have access to health benefits"); CINDY MANN ET AL., KAISER
COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, REACHING UNINSURED CHILDREN THROUGH
MEDICAID: IF YOU BUILD IT RIGHT, THEY WILL COME 8 (2002) (recommending that states
"[ljimit the number of documents families are required to supply and rely instead on comput-
erized data matches, audits, or other methods of assuring program integrity"); PERRY ET AL.,
supra note 75, at 15 (recommending that states "focus on greater convenience and smoother
processes" in order to boost enrollment).
77 DANIELLE HOLAHAN & ELISE HULBERT, UNITED HOSPITAL FUND OF NEW YORK, LESSONS
FROM STATES WITH SELF-DECLARATION OF INCOME POLICIES, at v (2004),
http://www.uhfnyc.org/ usr-doc/lessons.pdf.
78 DONNA COHEN ROSS & LAURA COX, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
BENEATH THE SURFACE: BARRIERS THREATEN TO SLOW PROGRESS ON EXPANDING HEALTH
COVERAGE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: A 50 STATE UPDATE ON ELIGIBILITY, ENROLLMENT,
RENEWAL AND COST-SHARING PRACTICES IN MEDICAID AND SCHIP, 3 fig.2 (2004),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Beneath-the-Surface-Barriers-Threaten-to-Slow-Progress-
on-Expanding-Health-Coverage-of-Children-and-Families-pdf.pdf (noting that procedural barri-
ers to Medicaid access began to be reintroduced in 2001).
7 Id. at 7 fig.3.
80 Id. at 8.
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will be to thin the Medicaid rolls by weeding out eligible citizen bene-
ficiaries-precisely the group for whom Rep. Norwood professes
"compassion." Even more disturbing is the fact that Section 6036's
effects will be borne disproportionately by the most vulnerable within
this group of eligible citizens.
In large part, this is because many Americans do not have ready
access to their birth certificates, and those of lower socioeconomic
status are substantially more likely to fall into this category. Accord-
ing to a national telephone survey conducted in January 2006, 5.7%
of all U.S.-born adults do not possess a birth certificate or a passport.
This number rises to 7% for senior citizens, 8.1% for those with an
annual income below $25,000, 8.9% for African-American adults,
9.1% for adults livin in rural areas, and 9.2% for adults without a
high school diploma. A total of 10.3% of U.S.-born adults who have
incomes below $25,000 and have children reported they did not have
a birth certificate or passport for at least one of their children 82
These figures suggest that between 3.2 and 4.6 million currently eli-
gible Medicaid beneficiaries are not currently in a position to comply
with Section 6036.83
Many of these individuals, especially among those born in the first
half of the 20th century, do not have a birth certificate in their pos-
session because none exists. 84 Historically, the gaps in the birth regis-
tration system in the United States have been dramatic and, once
again, directly correlated with socio-economic status. An estimated
7.5% of U.S. births in 1940 were not formally recorded; among non-
whites, the figure is 18%, among non-whites living in rural areas,
24.2%, and among rural non-white births outside of a hospital, 24.9%
went unregistered.85 By 1950, the system of birth registration had
81 LEIGHTON KU ET AL., CENTER FOR BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, SURVEY INDICATES
BUDGET RECONCILIATION BILL JEOPARDIZES MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR 3 TO 5 MILLION U.S.
CITIZENS (2006), http://www.cbpp.org/ 1-26-06health.htm#_ftnrefl 4.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Ira Rosenwaike & Leslie F. Stone, Verification of the Ages of Supercentenarians in the United
States: Results of a Matching Study, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 727-39 (2003), available at http://muse.
jhu.edu/journals/demography/v040/40.4rosenwaike.pdf (describing the lack of birth certifi-
cates among extremely elderly persons); see also Mark E. Hill et al., Age-Linked Institutions and Age
Reporting Among Older African Americans 2 (Pop. Aging Rsrch. Ctr., Univ. of Penn., Working Pa-
per No. WPS 95-05, 1995), available at http://www.pop.upenn.edu/rc/parc/aging-center/
1995/PARCwps95-05.pdf ("[B]irth registration in the United States was seriously deficient well
into the 20th century. As late as 1959, a birth certificate could be located for less than one-third
of a sample of persons aged 45 and over"); Ira Rosenwaike & Mark E. Hill, The Accuracy of Age
Reporting Among Elderly African-Americans: Evidence of a Birth Registration Effect 2 (Pop. Aging
Rsrch. Ctr., Univ. of Penn., Working Paper No. WPS 95-04, 1995), available at
http://www.pop.upenn.edu/rc/parc/agingcenter/ 1995/PARCwps95-04.pdf (same).
85 See Sam Shapiro, Recent Testing of Birth Registration Completeness in the United States, 8
POPULATION STUD. 3,15-16 tbls.2 & 4 (1954) (examining birth registration in 1950).
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greatly expanded but was still far from universal and especially likely
to bypass certain groups: 2.1% of births nationwide were undocu-
mented, but the number is 6.5% for non-white births, 11.3% for rural
non-whites in general, and 12.5% for rural non-whites who did not
give birth in a hospital.16 The same pattern emerges when one looks
at the educational attainment of mothers. In 1940, a birth certificate
was lacking for 2.6% of children born to a mother who had attended
at least one year of college, but 20.7% of the children of mothers who
had 4 years or fewer of school were unregistered. By 1950, only 0.4%
of the children of the most educated mothers were undocumented,
while 9.2% of the children born to the least educated mothers re-
mained unrecognized 7
Every state provides that individuals for whom no birth certificate
exists may apply for a delayed certificate of birth registration. It is
clear, however, that a significant number of applicants will be unable
to comply with the necessary procedures. For instance, in Texas, the
procedure is as follows: first, an applicant pays a fee of $22.00 to the
Department of Vital Statistics and completes a form requesting a
search for the non-existent certificate. This process can take up to
three weeks.8 Once the record is not found, the Department will
provide instructions for completing and filing a "Delayed Certificate
of Birth Form" which must be signed before a notary public and
submitted along with three documents that prove date and place of
birth, one of which verifies parents' names, all of which are five years
old or older, and at least one of which was created within 10 years of
birth. The cost for filing a Delayed Certificate of Birth is $25.00.
Certified copies are $22.00 each. Supporting documentation must be
verified by department staff, which will confirm information with out-
side entities. Because of this requirement, the processing time is
generally eight to ten weeks. If the supporting documentation is not
sufficient, processing could take several more weeks. If the docu-
mentation requirement cannot be met, the Department may refer
the applicant to county probate court, where there will be further
86 Id.
7 Id. at tbl.4. See also S.H. Preston et al., African-American Mortality at Older Ages: Results of a
Matching Study, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 193, 193-209 (1996) (illustrating the difficulty in determining
life expectancy among elderly blacks due to a lack of birth certificates); Douglas V. Almond et
al., Civil Rights, the War on Poverty, and Black-White Convergence in Infant Mortality in Missis-
sippi, 50 fig.7B (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/~almond/mississippi.pdf (chart-
ing trends in hospital births in Mississippi and Georgia); Rosenwaike & Hill, Accuracy of Age Re-
porting, supra note 84, at 733-34 (noting the difficulty of accurately tracking trends in African-
American life expectancy due to lack of reliable birth records).
88 Texas Department of State Health Services, Delayed Certificate of Birth Registration,
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/vs/delayed/default.shtm (last visited Aug. 18, 2006); Texas De-
partment of State Health Services, Certified Copy of a Birth Certificate,
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/vs/reqproc/certifiedscopy.shtm (last visited Aug. 18, 2006).
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documentation requirements, fees, and delays.89 With millions of low-
income, elderly, homeless, or physically and mentally disabled
Americans simultaneously attempting to comply ,with the require-
ments of Section 6036, delays will be compounded.'
Echoing the above concerns, several state Medicaid directors have
publicly voiced their conclusion that Section 6036, far from preserv-
ing Medicaid for U.S. citizens, will indeed make it more inaccessible.
Ohio Medicaid Director Barbara Edwards has noted that Ohio's
elimination of a birth certificate requirement led to improvement in
coverage and re-enrollment for eligible children.9' Connecticut
Medicaid Director David Parrella has expressed concern over the
"tremendous administrative burden" posed by Section 6036, which
will "slow things down" and drive eligible applicants away.2 Accord-
ing to Wisconsin Medicaid Director Mark Moody, the new require-
ment "will have a significant impact on enrollment. '
Rep. Norwood's inability to provide a coherent explanation of the
function of Section 6036 is not of overriding significance; in the final
analysis, he was but one vote in its favor. Perhaps there are alterna-
tive means of making sense of the requirement? Perhaps, for in-
stance, Section 6036 is best understood as an unpleasant but neces-
sary form of "informal rationing" designed to limit public spending. 4
Of course, budget and policy considerations will always impose limits
upon welfare spending; rationing is always necessary. But informal
rationing within the social welfare context is particularly perverse in
its operation, precisely because it:
may have the greatest deterrent effects on some of the neediest families.
For example, the burden of complying with many procedural require-
ments is likely to depend on the claimant's literacy, math ability, organ-
89 Id. See also Texas Department of State Health Services, Delayed Certificate of Birth Regis-
tration For Children 15 Years of Age or Older, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/vs/delayed/
15older.shtm (last visited Aug. 18, 2006).
90 Garland Land, executive director of the National Association for Public Health Statistics
and Information Systems, has observed, "We expect the legislation will increase the volume of
birth certificate requests by as much as 25 percent to 50 percent. Many vital records jurisdic-
tions may find it very difficult to manage this large of an increase of requests in such a short
time period." KU, SURvEY, supra note 81, at 7.
9 Lorraine Schofield, House Provision on Medicaid Citizenship Test Prompts State Unease, INSIDE
CMS, Nov. 17, 2005, available at http://www.aphsa.org/News/Doc/Article%20
in%201nside%20CMS%20-1 1-17-2005-%20on%2OMedicaid%2OCitizenship.pdf.
92 Id.
93 Schofield, supra note 91.
94 See generally David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model
for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 817, 854 (2004) ("Perhaps the most fundamental con-
cern about choice-based rationing systems is whether the outcomes they produce really do rep-
resent claimants' and potential claimants' choices at all and, to the extent they do, whether
those choices have the qualities that make them legitimate bases for allocating public re-
sources.").
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izational and social skills, and childcare and transportation resources.
Yet the claimants likely to be the weakest in those areas-and hence most
burdened-also are likely to have the poorestjob prospects and hence be
the neediest.95
The problem with the informal rationing of social benefits is, there-
fore, that it drives the neediest from programs that are intended to
alleviate need. While citizenship documentation surely would not
represent an insurmountable burden for the vast majority of people,
those for whom it would present such a burden are precisely those
whom Medicaid is designed to reach. The homeless, the mentally ill,
and the elderly are especially likely to be confounded by the new re-
quirement, but they will be joined by African-Americans whose moth-
ers were denied access to Jim Crow maternity wards and impover-
ished single parents who work full-time, deal with emergencies as
they arise, and have neither a dollar nor a minute to spare.
Yet Section 6036 cannot be explained fully even in this manner,
because, as noted above, it cannot be expected to succeed at the one
thing informal rationing has to recommend it: cutting costs.9 6 This
fact suggests that we must search more deeply for a proper under-
standing of the effects of Section 6036. Indeed, the rule will have ad-
ditional, more abstract ramifications.
Many scholars have pointed out that social welfare law is an ex-
pression of social values. 7 We recognize certain categories of need,
but we are ambivalent about these categories to varying degrees; we
express this ambivalence by modulating the degree of stigma we at-
tach to the members of each category. Procedure is the language
we use to communicate this stigma. Thus, as Amy Mulzer has written:
The more "worthy" the claimant, the less hesitant society is to aid her,
and the fewer the procedural limitations placed upon her participation
in the [social benefits] program. While claimants for cash assistance or
food stamps are subject to harsh or invasive verification procedures,
claimants who have validated their claim for aid through participation in
the labor force, and who have a socially acceptable reason for their cur-
rent inability to work-old age, for example, or disability-participate in
programs operated on a "social insurance" model, such as the Social Se-
95 Id.
96 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
97 See generally JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF
POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991); GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-
MORALIZATION OF SOCIETY: FROM VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MODERN VALUES (1995); LAWRENCE
MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986); FRANCES F.
PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE
(2d ed. 1993).
98 Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44
UCLA L. REv. 361, 374-76 (1996) (noting that attachment of stigma to public assistance deters
many from seeking the aid).
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curity retirement and disability programs. These non-means tested pro-
grams are federalized, "rule-bound, relatively evenhanded in [their] ad-
ministration, and [are operated] with little reported hassle."99
Mulzer's next sentence clarifies what is at stake in Section 6036:
"Likewise, claimants for in-kind programs such as Medicaid are
somewhat less likely to be subjected to invasive verification proce-
dures than claimants for cash assistance. '" 100
Viewed from this angle, we see that perhaps Section 6036's most
significant effect will be to ratchet up the stigma attendant upon
Medicaid, as the law communicates the message that those in need of
health care are not to approach their government benefactors with a
sense of entitlement. Section 6036 decrees that fraudulent intent on
the part of applicants is to be presumed, in the absence of acceptable
documentary proof to the contrary. And the specific nature of the
fraud of which Medicaid applicants are presumed guilty is especially
telling: they are not Americans. Consequently, not only is the nation
free of obligation to the members of the least fortunate strata. Their
very need raises the suspicion that they are not members of the na-
tion at all.
Norwood claims to be barring the gates of America against alien
invasion. But Section 6036, when judged by its effects, is not an anti-
alien statute. When it slams the gates of the welfare state, it is all of
the poor who are left outside.
III. A MINIMAL RATIONAL BAsIs REVIEW OF SECTION 6036
You may well be convinced by the above that Section 6036's prin-
cipal effect will be to delay or bar access to health care by those who
are properly eligible; that those who are impacted will suffer a signifi-
cant harm; that those who will suffer will be, disproportionately, those
individuals who are most in need of assistance; that others, who wish
to misrepresent their citizen status, will succeed in doing so; that
while Section 6036 will likely result in some savings through reduc-
tions in the Medicaid rolls, this savings may be immediately offset by
increased administrative costs and it will certainly be offset over the
long term by costs resulting from delays in treatment and an increase
in the number of uninsured; and that Section 6036 is, at root, a stig-
matizing measure. Yet you may also believe that all of the above
should be disregarded by a court asked to rule on Section 6036's con-
stitutionality.
Amy Mulzer, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures
in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 663, 683-84 (2005) (citations
omitted).
100 Id. at 684.
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The Constitution places constraints on government action: its
'justice" mandate can be found in the "Due Process" Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which bars profoundly unfair acts;.' its "equality"
mandate can be found in the "Equal Protection" Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which protects against discriminatory classifica-
tion. °2 These requirements are equally binding upon all branches of
government, but Marbuy v. Madison stands for the consensus princi-
ple that the Supreme Court has the power to substitute its judgment
for that of members of other branches, voiding acts that it deems to
violate constitutional requirements; hence, 'judicial review."1 3  In
Lochner v. New York, the Court notoriously exercised the power of ju-
dicial review to void a New York law regulating labor conditions in
the baking industry, finding that it was an unjust burden on the free-
dom of contract protected by the Due Process Clause. 104  Backlash
against Lochner, however, ultimately led the New Deal court to cede
the entire field of economic regulation and social welfare to Con-
gress.0 5  Typical of the modern approach is Flemming v. Nestor,
16
where the court rejected a due process challenge to the termination
of Social Security benefits to the resident wife of a formerly resident
alien who has been deported as a Communist. Here, the Court an-
nounced that "when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual
benefit under a social welfare program ... we must recognize that the
Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the stat-
ute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in ra-
tional justification. The Court sounded the same note in Dandridge
101 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law."); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) ("Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and
just."); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (stating that due process is violated if a
practice or rule "offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental").
102 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Though the Fourteenth
Amendment is drafted as a limit on the power of the states, it has been held to bind the federal
government as well. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (justifying a decision to
prohibit Washington, D.C. public school segregation based on reasoning that the denial of
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests constitutes a violation of Fifth Amendment due proc-
ess rights).
103 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
04 Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
105 See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); see also Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2001) (citing
the conventional understanding of Lochner as "symbolic of an era during which courts inappro-
priately substituted their views as to proper social policy for those of representative assemblies").
106 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
107 Id. at 611.
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v. Williams,' s where it rejected the argument that Maryland's cap on
the total monthly welfare support available to a single family violated
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court rejected the reasoning as be-
ing of a time:
when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to
strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, improvident, or out
of harmony with a particular school of thought ..." "The problems of
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,
rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific"....
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to im-
pose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or so-
cial policy.' 9
Thus, as the Court states in Hodel v. Indiana, "[s]ocial and economic
legislation ... that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge
on fundamental rights must be upheld ... when the legislative means
are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."
' 10
As the rule articulated in Hodel duly notes, the Court has not en-
tirely abandoned judicial review. For instance, the Court will engage
in a more searching inquiry when the state has burdened the exercise
of a "fundamental right." The canon of rights-aside from those spe-
cifically protected in the text of the Constitution-now includes the
right to raise one's children,"' use contraception,1 1 2 receive an abor-
tion,' 13 live with one's family," 4 marry,"5 and refuse medical treat-
ment."6 Similarly, in the equal protection context, invidious classifi-
10S 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
109 Id. at 484-86 (citations omitted).
110 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981).
I See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1928) (affirming that state infringe-
ments on parental rights will be subject to strict scrutiny); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-
400 (1923) (holding that the right of parents to determine how their children will be educated
is fundamental and that state action that burdens this right is subject to strict scrutiny).
112 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965) (using strict scrutiny to analyze a
Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives because the statute impinges on the
right of marital privacy that is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
113 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-75 (1992) (holding that
state action that burdens the right to obtain an abortion is subject to heightened scrutiny); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973) (declaring that the right to obtain an abortion is funda-
mental and that state action that burdens this right is subject to strict scrutiny).
114 See Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (deciding that
the right of members of a family to live together is fundamental and that state action that bur-
dens this right is subject to strict scrutiny).
115 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (announcing that the right to marry is a
central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause and that state action that bur-
dens this right is subject to strict scrutiny).
116 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (pronouncing the right
to refuse medical treatment to be fundamental and subjecting state action that burdens this
right to strict scrutiny). Some legal scholars cite Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), for the
proposition that the Court also has recognized a fundamental right to sexual intimacy. This is
understandable, given that the doctrinal basis for the Court's decision in Lawrence is submerged
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cations raise judicial dander. Specifically, courts carefully will exam-
ine state action that classifies by race 1 1 or national origin 118-and, to
an "intermediate" degree, sex"
9 and illegitimacy. 120
But health is not a fundamental right, nor are the poor gener-
ally considered a protected class. 22  Consequently, any attempt to
in an argument that seems to belie it. Nonetheless, the Court declines to designate the right at
issue as fundamental and it accordingly applies heightened rational basis scrutiny. See Paul M.
Secunda, Lawrence's Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117, 131 (2005) ("[T]he best reading of Lawrence is that although
the liberty interest concerning personal autonomy is a 'substantial' or 'important' one, it is not
a fundamental one.").
117 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to a state statute clas-
sifying individuals by race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (explaining
how the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose of eliminating racial discrimination calls for the use
of strict scrutiny of state actions which rely on race-based classifications).
118 See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (analyzing a state statute that classifies
individuals by national origin using the standard of strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to classifications based on national origin);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (utilizing the strict scrutiny standard of review to
analyze nationality-based classifications). Also, state classification by alienage receives strict
scrutiny. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-23 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to a state statute
that classified by alienage); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (holding that
state classifications based on alien status are subject to strict scrutiny).
19 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a
state statute classifying individuals by sex); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-
24 (1982) (holding that a state statute creating gender-based classifications is subject to inter-
mediate scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a gender-based classification).
120 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (applying heightened scrutiny to a state stat-
ute classifying individuals by illegitimacy); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding
that classifications based on illegitimacy are subject to heightened scrutiny).
121 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) ("[T]he
Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such
aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself
may not deprive the individual."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (holding that the
States need not require that health care meet minimum standards as part of its provision for
public welfare).
1 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (holding that a North Da-
kota statute permitting some school districts to charge a user fee for bus transportation survives
an equal protection challenge based on a minimal rational basis standard of review, and noting
that "[w]e have previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having different effects on the
wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected to strict equal protection scru-
tiny"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (upholding restrictions on federal funding for
abortion against an equal protection challenge by applying a heightened rational basis standard
of review and holding that "poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification"); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (upholding Connecticut restrictions on abortion funding against
an equal protection challenge by applying a heightened rational basis review and holding that
"financial need alone [does not identify] a suspect class"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (applying a heightened rational basis standard of review to uphold
the Texas school financing system against an equal protection challenge); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (upholding the federal bankruptcy law's fee scheme against an equal
protection challenge by applying a heightened rational basis standard of review); Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that the poor are not a suspect class
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persuade a court to strike down Section 6036 as inconsistent with
constitutional values must run the gauntlet of rational-basis review.
2 3
To understand precisely what this would entail, we may refer to
two cases often cited for the proposition that "the rational-basis test
[is] used to review economic regulation under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses":124 Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.12 5 and FCC
v. Beach Communications, Inc.1
26
In Lee Optical, the Court considered a variety of due process and
equal protection challenges to an Oklahoma statute that had the ef-
fect of barring opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a
prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist. Holding that
no special circumstances dictated strict scrutiny, the Court applied a
rational basis standard of review and upheld the statute.'7 The sig-
nificance of the decision, however, is in the nature of "rational basis"
analysis the Court prescribes. According to the Court, neither the
and that an Oregon fee scheme for civil appeals withstands an equal protection challenge based
on a heightened rational basis standard of review); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)
(upholding a provision in the California Constitution requiring local referenda to approve
state-subsidized low-rent housing projects despite an equal protection challenge based on a
minimal rational basis standard of review); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)
(upholding a Maryland welfare law against an equal protection challenge, holding that "reason-
able basis" is the correct standard of review to apply in "the area of economics and social wel-
fare"). But see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969) (implying, in dicta, that clas-
sification by wealth is invidious); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)
(applying strict scrutiny to hold that poll taxes are unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds and observing that "[I]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race,
are traditionally disfavored"); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (applying strict scrutiny
to strike down an Illinois fee requirement for appeals of felony convictions on both due process
and equal protection grounds). For historical accounts of the development of the Court's wel-
fare rights jurisprudence, see generally ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE
WARREN COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997); MARTHA F.
DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); R.
SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994).
123 See, e.g., Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) ("In enacting legislation [provid-
ing for governmental payments of monetary benefits], a government does not deny equal pro-
tection 'merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.' If the classification
has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification
'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" (ci-
tation omitted)); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 750, 770 (1975) (holding that a statutory classifi-
cation in the area of social welfare, such as social security legislation, is consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause if it is rationally based and free from invidious discrimination); Vill. of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (asserting that economic and social legislation en-
acted by a legislature that has drawn lines in the exercise of its discretion will be upheld if it is
reasonable, not arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) ("[T]he Constitution does not empower this
Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited
public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.").
124 E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2669 (2005) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
!25 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
126 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
127 348 U.S. at 486-90.
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state's actual aim nor the actual relationship between the statute and
the state's aim may be considered. Rather, " [i] t is enough that there
is an evil... and that it might be thought that the particular legisla-
tive measure was a rational way to correct it."' 28 The Court concludes
that "it might be thought" that the Oklahoma statute was a rational
response to the desire to ensure that citizens had regular eye exami-
nations;129 the statute is, accordingly, upheld. The Lee Optical rational
basis review thus takes place entirely on a hypothetical plane.
The Lee Optical approach to rational basis review is forcefully ech-
oed in FCC v. Beach Communications. Here, the Court denied the mer-
its of an equal protection challenge to a federal statute that distin-
guished among cable television facilities for regulatory purposes. In
the process, the Court articulated a clear rule: "Where there are
'plausible reasons' for Congress's action, 'our inquiry is at an end. '""
The Court added: "a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data."'
31
Under the Lee Optical-Beach "social and economic regulation" stan-
dard, then, Section 6036 would survive judicial review. A court might
grant that Section 6036 was unwise, unfair, illogical, and improvi-
dent-but the court still would be forced to conclude that a legisla-
ture conceivably could rationally speculate (if totally insulated from
empirical data) that the phenomenon of noneligible noncitizens
fraudulently claiming full Medicaid benefits was imposing significant
costs and that this phenomenon could be addressed effectively by re-
quiring that all Medicaid beneficiaries produce citizenship documen-
tation.
Section 6036 would survive this pseudo-review, 32 but this would be
the wrong result.
IV. THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SECTION 6036:
HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Lee Optical-Beach minimal scrutiny is not the only doctrinally le-
gitimate form of rational basis review. As the Court stated in U.S.
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, after surveying equal protection ra-
tional basis decisions, even "[t] he most arrogant legal scholar would
128 Id. at 488.
129 Id.
130 Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 313-14 (citation omitted).
131 Id. at 315.
132 Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 359 (1999) ("Any statute could survive a review
that freely hypothesizes purpose and does not insist that there be any connection in fact be-
tween a classification and such a hypothesized purpose.").
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not claim that all of these cases applied a uniform or consistent
test." 13 3 Most students of the Supreme Court have followed Gerald
Gunther in modestly distinguishing between conventional rational
basis review cases from those that apply "heightened rational basis" or
"rational basis with bite. '3 a
The Court has never explicitly acknowledged the existence of
heightened rational basis review, so it would be surprising if a co-
herent approach emerged from the case law. 36  Nonetheless, ele-
ments regularly recur: (1) government action has specially burdened
a group; (2) the action is a poor fit with potentially legitimate gov-
ernment interests; (3) the burden is significant; (4) the burdened
group is a disfavored minority; and (5) the government's action was
motivated by hostility toward the group.
In the due process context, we have to date only one heightenedr 137
rational basis analysis, in the case of Lawrence v. Texas. 7Examining a
Texas statute that criminalized sexual relations between members of
the same sex, the decision discusses the importance of the liberty in-
terest at stake in expansive terms but declines to designate this inter-
est as fundamental, a move that would dictate heightened scrutiny, as
Justice Scalia's dissent points out.'38 Nonetheless, the Court's discus-
133 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980). One scholar has identified seven variants of rational basis
review. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Con-
stitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court
Practice, 4 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 225, 236 (2002).
ilu See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search Of Evolving Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model
For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25-37 (1972) (surveying 1971 Supreme Court
decisions sustaining or remanding equal protection claims without invoking the strict scrutiny
formula and concluding that "old equal protection formulations have been given an interven-
tionist twist in a significant number of cases"); see also, Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and
Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (distinguishing between cases
that apply highly deferential rational basis review and cases that "used rationality review to
monitor closely the purposes a legislature sought to advance"); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Ra-
tional Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 800 (1987) ("[T]he
Court is now willing to employ a searching scrutiny under the guise of traditional rational basis
review; that is, to employ rational basis with bite.").
135 But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring), discussed
infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
136 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-33, at 1614 (2d ed. 1988)
(observing that the Court "has never provided a coherent explanation" of the circumstances
that trigger a heightened form of rationality review); Farrell, supra note 132, at 357-58 (examin-
ing every successful rational basis claim under the Equal Protection Clause decided in the Su-
preme Court between 1971 and 1996 and concluding that "the Court's selection of cases to
which it will give a heightened, less deferential rationality review follows no obvious pattern.
The Court never explains why it has selected a particular case for heightened rationality. The
Court's analysis differs from case to case. None of these cases has had a significant precedential
impact on subsequent cases. For the most part, once the case has been decided, the Court ig-
nores it.").
137 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
138 Id. at 599.
[Vol. 8:5
POOR LAW THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT
sion of the statute is free of speculation regarding hypothetically le-
gitimate purposes; on the contrary, it accepts as self-evident that the
actual purpose of the legislation is to stigmatize homosexual sexual
conduct: "The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the
State to enforce [condemnation of homosexual conduct as immoral]
on the whole society.' '3 9 Having defined for itself the purpose of the
Texas statute, the Court concludes that it is illegitimate. "[T] he fact
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a par-
ticular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice."'"4 Justice O'Connor's concurring opin-
ion provides a revealing gloss on the majority's analysis. Arguing that
the case should have been decided on equal protection grounds,
O'Connor states with clarity: "When a law exhibits.., a desire to
harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more search-
ing form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the
Equal Protection Clause.' 141 It appears that similar considerations
dictated similarly "searching" analysis under the due process analysis.
Lawrence can be understood as an extension of Romer v. Evans,
42
which features a similar analysis under the rubric of equal protection.
Here, the court applies heightened rational basis review to hold inva-
lid a provision of Colorado's constitution that prohibited all levels of
state and local government from taking actions to protect gays and
lesbians. The Court's opinion is devoid of hypothetical explanations;
it even dismisses the state's attempt to explain its own motives.14 Be-
cause the provision was "at once too narrow and too broad,'' 4  the
Court concluded that it was "inexplicable by anything but animus to-
ward the class it affects., ,"14  Regarding animus, the decision is unam-
biguous: "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of
the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare.., desire to harm a politically ungopular group cannot consti-
tute a legitimate governmental interest."'
The Romer court attributes its views on animus to U.S. Dept. of Agri-
culture v. Moreno,147 a case that is especially relevant to an analysis of
Section 6036. Here, the Court examined a section of the Food Stamp
Act that categorically excluded from eligibility all households con-
taining any individuals who bore no familial relation to other resi-
'39 Id. at 571.
140 Id. at 577-78 (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 580.
142 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
143 Id. at 626 (describing the State's reading of the amendment as "implausible").
144 Id. at 621.
145 Id. at 632.
146 Id. at 634 (citations omitted).
147 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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dents. The government argued that the statute was rationally related
to the goal of minimizing fraud: households with unrelated members
were more likely than others to contain individuals who misrepre-
sented their income or voluntarily remained poor, and such house-
holds were also relatively unstable, making abuses particularly diffi-
cult to detect. 14  But the Court noted the availability of alternative
and effective mechanisms for protection against fraud, concluding
that " [t] he existence of these provisions necessarily casts considerable
doubt upon the proposition that the [statute] could rationally have
been intended to prevent those very same abuses." 49 More impor-
tantly, the Court objected that the statute was so overinclusive and
underinclusive as to rule out any rational relation to fraud-
prevention: those who were intent on deception could simply set up
separate households, while those who were so poor that they could
not afford to alter their living arrangements would be cut off.150 By
critically examining the relationship between the statute and the gov-
ernment's purported objectives, the Court smoked out Congress's
real, illegitimate aim: "The legislative history.., indicates that that
amendment was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie
communes' from participating in the food stamp program.' 5 ' This
the Court found to be unacceptable, coining the phrase that echoed
forcefully in Romer "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est."'
5
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cente' 5 3 fits the same mold. Here,
the Court voided a Texas city's attempt to impose a licensing re-
quirement upon group homes for the mentally retarded. The deci-
sion went to great lengths to explain its refusal to grant heightened
scrutiny to the mentally retarded as a "quasi-suspect class. None-
theless, the rational basis review ultimately performed by the Court
was decidedly heightened. Hypothetical justifications for the law
were nowhere suggested. Instead, the court critically examined the
city's claims regarding its actual purposes, rejecting them as pretex-
tual because the means chosen were radically underinclusive: for in-
stance, if the city aimed to control the number of people occupying
single dwellings, why did it not require licenses from hospitals or fra-
148 Id. at 535.
149 Id. at 536-37.
15 Id. at 537-38.
151 Id. at 534.
152 Id. ("[A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot consti-
tute a legitimate governmental interest.").
15 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
154 Id. at 442-46.
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ternities?15' Having eliminated the city's explanations as beyond be-
lief, the court concluded that, once again, "irrational prejudice" was
at the root of legislation. 5  The Court struck down the law as an
equal protection violation, because irrational prejudice is not a le-
gitimate state aim. '
In other cases, such as James v. Strange,'5 the Court has been even
more aggressive. At issue here was a part of a Kansas scheme that
provided that the state had the right to recover the costs of public de-
fense from indigent defendants and that, when indigents defaulted
upon their assessments, the defendants were not permitted to avail
themselves of certain restrictions on state recoupment procedures,
such as a cap on weekly garnishment of wages, that were available to
other judgment debtors. The Supreme Court voided the statute as
an equal protection violation that did not survive heightened rational
basis review. The Court observed that the scheme placed a great
burden upon the members of the class, whose hopes for "self-
sufficiency and self-respect" the statute "blighted."'' 9 The fact that al-
ternative means of achieving the state's goals were available was taken
into consideration as well.' Ultimately, the Court weighed the bur-
dens to members of the class against the statute's benefits to the state
and concluded that the disproportion revealed "elements of puni-
tiveness and discrimination" sufficient to render the statute invalid.16
This conclusion is especially striking because it appears that the
Court accepted that the statute did indeed have a rational relation to
the legitimate state aim of cost recovery.
6 2
All the above decisions have a similar structure: through critical
analysis, the Court peels away the government's defenses, revealing a
core of impermissible animus toward a disfavored minority.' 63 The
revelation of the animus seals the law's fate. Why should this be so?
15 Id. at 450.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 446.
15 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
159 Id. at 141-42.
160 Id. at 141.
161 Id. at 142.
162 Id. at 138.
163 As noted above, the decisions surveyed also share another significant feature: they abstain
from announcing their own doctrinal status. Kermit Roosevelt III sees this as strategic "subter-
fuge" motivated by "the desire not to authorize lower courts to apply the rule the Court refuses
to announce." Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1691 (2005). On this view, there is no heightened rational basis
review doctrine as such; there are only individual and aberrant cases where the Court has de-
cided to ignore its own decision rules and instead get the "right" result.
Lower courts have indeed been reluctant to recognize the existence of heightened rational
basis review. See, e.g., Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004) (refusing to employ
heightened rational basis review to examine economic legislation because, inter alia, the Court
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The Court has taken great pains to clarify that its minimal rational
basis decisions are grounded in a constitutionally-mandated faith in
democratic decision-making processes. As Justice Blackmun wrote
for the Court in Nordlinger v. Hahn: "Time and again.. . this Court
has made clear in the rational-basis context that the 'Constitution
presumes that ... even improvident decisions will eventually be recti-
fied by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is gen-
erally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political
branch has acted."' 164 The Beach Court finds this presumption to be
wise policy: "Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of
judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative
branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.
1 6
5
Yet, consistent with its underlying theory, the canonical formula-
tion of rational basis review forthrightly acknowledges that total judi-
cial deference is not always appropriate. The Blackmun quotation
from Nordlinger, sans ellipses, reads: "the 'Constitution presumes that,
absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process." 66  The implicit
idea is that deference should be at its lowest ebb when there is reason
to believe that democratic processes are not functioning as they
should, so that legislators are promoting the interests of an in-group
at the expense of an out-group. The most influential articulation of
this theme can be found in the famous fourth footnote to Carolene
Products. Here, the Court ponders whether it might be said that "leg-
islation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohi-
bitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation."' 67 Indeed, "prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
has never explicitly acknowledged the existence of the doctrine, nor has it "provid[ed] [a]
principled foundation for determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked").
164 505 U.S. 1, 17 (1992) (citation omitted). Rather, more acidly, Stephen Loffredo has ob-
served that "[w]henever one finds paeans to democracy in United States Reports, there is a fair
chance that the Court has just dispatched a poor person's claim of constitutional right."
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1290
(1993); see also id. at 1290 n.50 (calculating that "[nlearly 40% of all postwar cases that invoke
the term 'presumption of constitutionality' to uphold legislation involve the Court's denial of a
poor person's claim.").
'65 FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
166 505 U.S. 17 (emphasis added).
167 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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searching judicial inquiry."'' 68  While the Carolene language is often
cited as the origin of a "discrete and insular minority" test for exten-
sions of equal protection heightened scrutiny classifications, the "dis-
crete and insular" language is suggested as merely one potential
means of addressing the Court's real concern: that hostility toward
an unpopular minority can render that minority effectively unable to
protect its interests through the democratic process.
In Section 6036, we have legislation placing a special burden upon
indigents in need of public assistance. Is there "reason to infer" con-
gressional "antipathy" to this class that would interfere with its ability
to defend itself through the political process? There is.
The Constitution avers in its opening phrase that it speaks for "the
people of the United States."6 9 But the Founders had no interest in
providing a legal definition of the single "people" they were invent-
ing. For instance, while members of the House of Representatives
were to be "chosen ... by the people of the several states,"'70 these
states had discretion to define their "people" for themselves: "the
electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for elec-
tors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature., 17 Simi-
larly, presidential electors were appointed by state legislatures, in
whatever manner they chose.' The only limit on state discretion in
matters of suffrage in the original Constitution can be implied from
Article IV, Section 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every
state in this union a republican form of government." 7' Yet no defi-
nition of "republican" is provided.7 4
By drafting the Constitution in this manner, the Founders pro-
tected and perpetuated the disenfranchisement of the poor. As
Alexander Keyssar found in his significant study, The Right to Vote:
The Contested History of Democracy in the United States:
The lynchpin of... suffrage regulations was the restriction of voting to
adult men who owned property. On the eve of the American Revolution,
in seven colonies men had to own land of specified acreage or monetary
value in order to participate in elections; elsewhere, the ownership of
168 Id. See also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 715
(1985) (explaining that "the Carolene theory is to seize the high ground of democratic theory").
169 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
170 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
171 Id.
72 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1
175 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
174 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (holding that questions arising under
this section are political, not judicial, in character and that "it rests with Congress to decide
what government is the established one in a State ... as well as its republican character").
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personal property of a designated value (or in South Carolina, the pay-' 75
ment of taxes) could substitute for real estate.
Though local evidence is spotty, Keyssar estimates that roughly 40%
of adult white males were disenfranchised under the constitutional
scheme, together with nearly all women, African-Americans, and Na-
tive-Americans. 76 That the Founders desired this result can be seen
from the records of the Constitutional Convention, where the brief
debate on the question of suffrage was framed by Gouverneur Mor-
ris's concern that voting rights were being spread too broadly.
7
Between 1790 and 1850, most states eliminated explicit limits of
the franchise to property holders and taxpayers. 78 With the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Constitution recog-
nized for the first time such a thing as a "right to vote" 79 that should
not be denied due to economic status, though this right is protected
in a peculiarly tortured manner. Section 2 punishes state deviations
from an ideal model of adult male suffrage, whether in state or fed-
eral elections, by deducting the number of excluded adult males
from the state's total adult male population as used to calculate the
size of its delegation in the House of Representatives.'o" This provi-
sion has the perverse effect of further punishing those who are ex-
cluded from the franchise: not only will they have no vote, but their
175 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES 5 (2000).
176 Id. at 7. Five New England states permitted blacks to vote on the same terms as whites,
and otherwise qualified NewJersey women had voting rights. Id. at 6, 20. See also Pamela S. Kar-
Ian, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1348
(discussing the history of state constitutions limiting suffrage to white men).
177 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 201-11 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966); see also RobertJ. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 335, 376 (1989) (noting the simultaneous rise of pauper exclusion clauses and abolition of
property qualifications and finding that the Founding generation believed that "all men were
entitled to govern themselves, but that only property ownership allowed them actually to do
so").
The founding consensus in favor of excluding the impoverished from the American demos
can be seen in unvarnished form in the Northwest Ordinance, enacted in 1787 by the Conti-
nental Congress under the Articles of Confederation and affirmed with slight modifications in
1789 by the first U.S. Congress under the Constitution. The document is lauded to this day as
one of the greatest achievements of American nation-building. See, e.g., Denis P. Duffey, Note,
The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 933 (1995) (arguing
that the Northwest Ordinance should be considered on par with the Declaration of Independ-
ence and the Federalist Papers as a document that "authoritatively expresses a guiding set of
principles" of the U.S. Constitution). Congress declared in the Northwest Ordinance that "a
freehold in fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen of one of the states, and being
resident in the district, or the like freehold and two years residence in the district, shall be nec-
essary to qualify a man as an elector of a representative." The Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1
Stat. 50, 51 (1789).
178 KEYSSAR, supra note 175, at 29.
179 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
180 Id.
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state's representatives cannot even claim to represent them "virtu-
ally." They are instead totally written out of the constitutional order.
Of course, the end of explicitly class-based franchise restrictions
did not mark the full integration of the American poor into the
demos. To start with, a substantial portion of the poor were denied
political rights on the basis of race and gender. For the remaining
sub-group of white male poor, the dominant trend between 1855 and
World War I was the rolling back of newly acquired rights. For in-
stance, Massachusetts imposed an unprecedented literacy test upon
voters in 1855, in an effort to keep Irish workers away from the
polls. " ' Georgia revoked the franchise from impoverished white
males in 1860, for similar reasons.l8
The formal political disenfranchisement of the American indigent
persisted well into the 20th century. When Congress debated the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1956, it considered adding a clause that
would permit states to retain their pauper exclusion provisions.8 3 In
1957, the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted elderly pensioners an
exemption from that state's pauper exclusion rule, which remained
on the books.1s4 In 1972, Massachusetts finally deleted the pauper ex-
clusion clause from its constitution, but in the statewide referendum
on the question, roughly 20% of the electorate voted to keep the ex-
clusion in place. A similar referendum in Rhode Island was de-
feated.'8 5 Thus, "despite its pioneering role in promoting democratic
values, the United States was one of the last countries in the devel-
oped world to attain universal suffrage." 8 6
There is ample evidence that our political system has not over-
come this legacy of deliberate disenfranchisement. A meta-analysis of
recent research concluded that "[s]tudents of civic involvement in
America are unanimous in characterizing political input through po-
litical participation as being extremely unequal.' 87  Thus, "only 29
percent of individuals in families with incomes under $15,000 are af-
filiated with a political organization, compared with 73 percent
181 KEYsSAR, supra note 175, at 86.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 271.
184 Id.
1S Id. at 272.
186 Id. at xxiii-xxiv. But see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973) (noting that the impoverished plaintiffs do not constitute a cognizable class in part be-
cause they have not been subjected to "a history of purposeful unequal treatment"). The
Court's refusal to acknowledge the history of discrimination against the poor in the United
States is itself strong evidence in support of the postulate that members of the group cannot
rely upon the majority for rational decision-making.
187 Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., Inequalities of Political Voice, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 19 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
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among those in families earning over $75,000.'0I18 A similar pattern is
reflected in voting statistics. Looking at data from the 2000 elections,
the Census Bureau concluded that:
Citizens with higher incomes were more likely to vote. The voting rate
among people living in families with annual incomes of $50,000 or more
was 72 percent, compared with 38 percent for people living in families
with incomes of under $10,000. Together, about one-half of those who
voted in the November 2000 election lived in families with incomes of
$50,000 or more.' 89
Such data leads the historian Keyssar to observe that 21st century
"nonvoters come disproportionately from the same social groups that
in earlier decades were the targets of restrictions on the franchise."' 90
If indigent Americans truly were shut out of the American politi-
cal process one would expect to find substantive outcomes that were
hostile to their interests. This is the case. In fact, it is what most dis-
tinguishes U.S. social demographics from those of other developed
democracies. The American poor are legion' 91 and their numbers are
growing; 92 the extent of economic inequality is breathtaking 3 and
accelerating (See Tables 1, 2, 3). These facts have been shaped by
political choices (See Table 4) .94 As one group of political scientists
concluded, upon surveying the most current data: "economic ine-
188 LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, Studying Inequality and American Democracy: Find-
ings and Challenges, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 187, at 216.
189 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2000, at
5 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf.
190 KEYSSAR, supra note 175, at 320. In this context, the continuing impact of felon disen-
franchisement should not be overlooked. An estimated 4.7 million disproportionately poor and
African-American felons and ex-felons are currently prohibited from voting. See Jacob S.
Hacker et al., Inequality and Public Policy in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note
187, at 203 n.17; Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction: The Political Conse-
quences of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 777, 778 (2001)
("The United States stands alone in the democratic world in imposing restrictions on the voting
rights of a very large group of non-incarcerated felons.").
191 The U.S. Census estimates the total number of Americans living below the poverty line at
37 million, or 12.7% of the total U.S. population. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at
9 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf.
19- Id. (showing that poverty has risen in each of the last four years).
193 Tony Judt, Europe vs. America, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 10, 2005, at 4 ("In
the US today the richest 1 percent holds 38 percent of the wealth .... .").
194 See Robert M. Solow, Welfare: The Cheapest Country, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 23,
2000, at 20-23, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/177 ("[Mlarket outcomes are not
less egalitarian here than in Europe generally.... [But] the US eliminates much less poverty
than any other [major developed country]. The 'post-tax-and-transfer' deep poverty rate in the
US is more than twice as high as the average of the other fourteen countries."); see also GARTH
L. MANGUM ET AL., THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (2003) ("The fact
that so many developed countries with lower per capita gross domestic products (GDPs) have
lower relative poverty rates than the United States indicates that the persistence [of poverty in
the United States] is, at least in part, a matter of policy choice.")
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quality in the United States is greater than in other nations in part
because U.S. public policy is less focused on trying to ensure equal-
ity .
,,195
The system of tiered review dictates that under certain circum-
stances judges must suspend their faculty for rational thought. But it
also provides for the exercise of rational thought when deciding
when to suspend it. The data presented above provide good reason
to infer that antipathy against the poor impedes their ability to use
the political process effectively. This well-founded inference is, in
turn, good reason for the courts to deploy a standard of heightened
rational basis review when confronted with legislation such as Section
6036. '96
When subjected to a properly heightened rational basis review,
Section 6036 does not fare well. With this provision, the government
has limited Medicaid eligibility to the class of U.S. citizens who are
not only indigent, but can prove their citizenship by producing a
birth certificate. The most straightforward basis upon which to de-
fend the statute is that it will reduce federal spending. But, as noted
above, Section 6036 will actually increase federal spending; it bears
no rational relationship to this legitimate goal.
In the alternative, the government might assert that Section 6036
bears a rational relation to the legitimate state aim of fraud reduc-
tion. But due to the peculiar nature of the U.S. system of birth regis-
tration, the class the government has created is an exceedingly poor
fit with this aim. Like the Cleburne zoning rule, Section 6036 is under-
inclusive: it will not deter those who are intent upon fraud, who can
easily obtain a fraudulent birth certificate. And like the exclusion of
certain households from Food Stamp eligibility at issue in Moreno,
Section 6036 is overinclusive: the amount of effort it takes to obtain a
valid birth certificate will deter many genuinely eligible citizens from
completing the Medicaid application process. Meanwhile-even
more so than the Kansas recoupment scheme at issue in James v.
Strange--the overinclusiveness of the rule will result in the most grave
kind of harm to those who are impacted: some whose lives would
have been saved by receiving proper medical treatment will instead
perish. Finally, there is no evidence of the existence of any meaning-
ful level of fraud and there are ample alternative mechanisms for ad-
dressing the concern (as in both Moreno and Strange). In sum, the
disproportion between the burden upon members of the class and
the benefits that will accrue the government leaves the Court with no
195 Hacker, supra note 190, at 157.
196 Of course, the presence of animus toward a politically vulnerable minority is also a classic
rationale for the application of strict scrutiny. With respect to classifications by wealth, however,
this possibility has been foreclosed. See supra note 122.
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choice but to conclude that Section 6036 rests ultimately upon ani-
mus toward those whose poverty renders them dependant upon pub-
lic assistance to meet basic medical needs-a disfavored minority like
the homosexuals targeted by the Texas anti-sodomy statute voided by
Lawrence and the Colorado anti-anti-discrimination amendment de-
clared unconstitutional in Romer.
The anti-poor animus of Section 6036 is of a piece with a continu-
ing legacy of disenfranchisement that has rendered democratic proc-
esses incapable of addressing the deepening crisis of social inequality
in the United States. Until very recently, the American poor were
denied the most basic prerogatives of citizenship; today, Section 6036
attempts once again to banish them from the demos. This aim is ille-
gitimate, rendering Section 6036's documentation requirement im-
permissible. Thankfully, our courts have a role to play in bringing
U.S. social policy into conformity with constitutional values.
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Household Income in OECD Countries: Ratio of 90th
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SOURCE: Economic Policy Institute, The State of Working America,
2002-03 (2003), Table 7.10
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TABLE 3
Distribution of Wealth in the U.S., 2001
Top 1% own 33%
Next 4% own 26%
Next 5% own 12%
Next 10% own 13%
Next 20% own 11% 80%
M id d le ............................................ .. ................. ........................................
Next 22% own 0.3% 40%
Bottom 18% have zero or 18%
negative net worth
SOURCE: Edward N. Wolff, Changes in Household Wealth in the 1980s
and 1990s in the U.S., (Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 407,
2004) available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/lev/wrkpap/407.html.
TABLE 4
Relative Poverty Rates (percent), 1991















United Kingdom 5.3 25.7
United States 11.7 21.0
SOURCE: L. Kenworthy, Do Social-Welfare Policies Reduce Poverty? A
Cross-National Assessment, (Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper
No. 188, 1998).
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